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Maisky, October 17, 1939
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Maisky, October 27, 1939
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INTRODUCTION TO THE MOONSPEAKER REPRODUCTION
There are a number of reproductions of Grover Furr's excellent essay below on several different websites. For this version at The Moonspeaker, its main purpose is to gather together all the references and take advantage of utf-8 encoding to make the russian, polish, and german materials legible. Otherwise, no changes have been made to the primary text except for the few listed below. The original essay, conclusion, and references can be found alongside many other excellent essays at Grover Furr's website.
Furr's work here is an excellent illustration of how a forthright historian striving to represent a challenge to accepted notions goes about their work, taking full advantage of the document access the web can offer. Having set out the argument up front, Furr sets out its sources, and then presents copious evidence for it, from newspaper article excerpts to treaties. Web links and full text references abound, together with encouragement to the reader to examine the sources for themselves and seek more information. Another important technique he uses is to read through the findings and evidence presented by other historians who would disagree with his position, noting where the materials they found fit his interpretation better than the one they prefer. But this technique cannot stand alone. It must be a second string to a first string based in primary source evidence.
In summary, here are the few alterations and additions to the text for the purpose of improving raw legibility and page navigation. Neither Furr's maintext nor his use of such emphasis markers as underlining, bold, and italics have been changed from the original.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Did the Soviet Union Invade Poland on September 17, 1939? Why ask? "We all know" this invasion occurred. "You can look it up!" All authoritative sources agree. This historical event happened.
Here's a recent article in The New York Review of Books (April 30, 2009, p. 17) by Timothy Snyder, Yale University professor, academic expert in this area – and fanatic anticommunist – who just has to know that what he writes here is, to put it politely, false:
Because the film (although not the book)* begins with the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941 rather than the joint German-Soviet invasion and division of Poland in 1939... the Soviet state had just months earlier been an ally of Nazi Germany... (* "Defiance")
"Behind Closed Doors" (PBS series 2009):
"After invading Poland in September 1939, the Nazis and the Soviets divided the country as they had agreed to do in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact…"
PBS Series, WWII Behind Closed Doors: The Struggle for Poland
Wikipedia article: "Soviet invasion of Poland":
"…on 17 September, the Red Army invaded Poland from the east…"
Wikipedia: Soviet Invasion of Poland
Every historian I have read, even those who do not conform to Cold War paradigms, state unproblematically that the Soviet Union invaded Poland in September 1939.
But the truth is that the USSR did not invade Poland in September, 1939. Even though the chances are at least 99 to 1 that every history book you can find says that it did. I have yet to find an English-language book that gets this correct. And, of course, the USSR had never been an "ally of Nazi Germany."
I will present a lot of evidence in support of this statement. There is a great deal more evidence to support what I say – much more than I can present here, and no doubt much more that I have not yet even identified or located.
Furthermore, at the time it was widely acknowledged that no such invasion occurred. I'll demonstrate that too.
Probably the truth of this matter was another victim of the post-WW2 Cold War, when a great many falsehoods about Soviet history were invented or popularized. The truth about this and many other questions concerning the history of the first socialist state has simply become "unmentionable in polite company."
Demonizing – I use the word advisedly, it is not too strong – the history of the communist movement and anything to do with Stalin has become de rigeur, a shibboleth of respectability. And not only among avowed champions of capitalism but among ourselves, on the left, among Marxists, opponents of capitalism, the natural constituency of a movement for communism.
Some time ago Doug Henwood tweaked me on the MLG [Marxist Literary Group] list for "defending Stalin."
I could make a crack about what defenses of Stalin have to do with a "sensible materialism," but that would be beneath me.
(MLG list May 17 2009)
Doug thinks he knows something about Stalin and the USSR during Stalin's time. He doesn't! But you can't blame him too much, since none of us do. More precisely: We "know" a lot of things about the Soviet Union and Stalin, and almost all of those things are just not true. We've been swallowing lies for the truth our whole lives.
I'll be brief in this presentation. I have prepared separate web pages with references to much of the evidence I have found (not all – there is just too much). [References are included on this page.] I'm also preparing a longer version for eventual publication.
For a discussion of the events that led up to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939 an excellent account is still Bill Bland, "The German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of 1939" (1990). I have checked every citation in this article; most are available online now. It's very accurate, but far more detailed than the present article requires.
Before we get into the question of the invasion that did not take place, the reader needs to become familiar with some misconceptions about the Nonaggression Treaty and why they are false. These too are based on anticommunist propaganda that is widely, if naively, "believed."
The most common, and most false, of these is stated above in the PBS series "[WWII] Behind Closed Doors."
…the Nazis and the Soviets divided the country as they had agreed to do in the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact…
This is completely false, as any reading of the text of the M-R Pact itself will reveal. Just read the words on the page (see below).
{See the text of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.}
It is conventionally stated as fact that the Nonaggression Pact between the USSR and Germany (often called the "Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact" or "Treaty" after the two foreign ministers who signed it) was an agreement to "partition Poland," divide it up.
This is completely false. I've prepared a page with much fuller evidence; see "The Secret Protocols to the M-R Pact Did NOT Plan Any Partition of Poland".
No doubt a big reason for this falsehood is this: Britain and France did sign a Nonaggression Pact with Hitler that "partitioned" another state – Czechoslovakia. That was the Munich Agreement of September 30, 1938.
Poland too took part in the "partition" of Czechoslovakia. Poland seized a part of the Cieszyn area of Czechoslovakia, even though it had only a minority Polish population. This invasion and occupation was not even agreed upon in the Munich Agreement. But neither France nor Britain did anything about it.
Hitler seized the remaining part of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. This had not been foreseen in the Munich Agreement. But Britain, France, and Poland did nothing about it.
So the anticommunist "Allies" Britain, France, and Poland really did participate in the partitioning of a powerless state! Maybe that's why the anticommunist "party line" is that the USSR did likewise? But whatever the reason for this lie, it remains a lie.
The Soviet Union signed the Nonaggression Pact with Germany not to "partition Poland" like the Allies had partitioned Czechoslovakia, but in order to defend the USSR.
The Treaty included a line of Soviet interest within Poland beyond which German troops could not pass in the event Germany routed the Polish army in a war.
The point here was that, if the Polish army were beaten, it and the Polish government could retreat beyond the line of Soviet interest, and so find shelter, since Hitler had agreed not to penetrate further into Poland than that line. From there they could make peace with Germany. The USSR would have a buffer state, armed and hostile to Germany, between the Reich and the Soviet frontier.
The Soviets – "Stalin," to use a crude synecdoche (= "a part that stands for the whole") – did not do this out of any love for fascist Poland. The Soviets wanted a Polish government – ANY Polish government – as a buffer between the USSR and the Nazi armies.
The utter betrayal of the fascist Polish Government of its own people frustrated this plan.
As far as the rest of the world was concerned, the Polish government had two alternatives in the event its army was smashed by an attacking army.
The governments of all other countries defeated by Germany did one or both of these things. The Polish government – racist, anticommunist, hyper-nationalist, – in short fascist, as bad as they get – didn't do either. Rather than fight the Polish government fled into neighboring Rumania.
Rumania was neutral in the war. By crossing into neutral Rumania the Polish government became prisoners. The legal word is "interned". They could not function as a government from Rumania, or pass through Rumania to a country at war with Germany like France, because to permit them to do that would be a violation of Rumania's neutrality, a hostile act against Germany.
I will discuss "internment" and the international law on this question extensively below.
When Poland had no government, Poland was no longer a state. (More detailed discussion below).
What that meant was this: at this point Hitler had nobody with whom to negotiate a cease-fire, or treaty.
Furthermore, the M-R Treaty's Secret Protocols were void, since they were an agreement about the state of Poland and no state of Poland existed any longer. Unless the Red Army came in to prevent it, there was nothing to prevent the Nazis from coming right up to the Soviet border.
Or – as we now know they were in fact preparing to do – Hitler could have formed one or more pro-Nazi states in what had until recently been Eastern Poland. That way Hitler could have had it both ways: claim to the Soviets that he was still adhering to the "spheres of influence" agreement of the M-R Pact while in fact setting up a pro-Nazi, highly militarized fascist Ukrainian nationalist state on the Soviet border.
Once the Nazis had told the Soviets that they, the Nazis, had decided that the Polish state no longer existed, then it did not make any difference whether the Soviets agreed or not. The Nazis were telling them that they felt free to come right up to the Soviet border. Neither the USSR nor any state would have permitted such a thing. Nor did international law demand it.
At the end of September a new secret agreement was concluded. In it the Soviet line of interest was far to the East of the "sphere of influence" line decided upon a month earlier in the Secret Protocol and published in Izvestiia and in the New York Times during September 1939. This reflected Hitler's greater power, now that he had smashed the Polish military. See the map at New Spheres of Influence.
In this territory Poles were a minority, even after the "polonization" campaign of settling Poles in the area during the 1920s and 1930s. You can see the ethnic/linguistic population map at Map of the Curzon Line.
How do we know the USSR did not commit aggression against, or "invade," Poland when it occupied Eastern Poland beginning on September 17, 1939 after the Polish Government had interned itself in Rumania? Here are nine pieces of evidence:
The Rumanian position recognized the fact that Moscicki was blowing smoke when he claimed he had legally resigned on September 30. So the Rumanian government fabricated a story according to which Moscicki had already resigned back on September 15, just before entering Rumania and being interned (NYT 10.04.39, p.12). Note that Moscicki himself did not claim this!
Rumania needed this legal fiction to try to sidestep the following issue. Once Moscicki had been interned in Rumania – that is, from September 17 1939 on – he could not function as President of Poland. Since resignation is an official act, Moscicki could not resign once he was in Rumania.
For our present purposes, here's the significant point: Both the Polish leaders and the Rumanian government recognized that Poland was bereft of a government once the Polish government crossed the border into Rumania and were interned there.
Both Moscicki and Rumania wanted a legal basis – a fig-leaf – for such a government. But they disagreed completely about this fig-leaf, which exposes it as what it was – a fiction.
The Polish government later claimed that it had "released" Rumania from its obligations under this military treaty in return for safe haven in Rumania.
But there is no evidence for this statement. No wonder: it is at least highly unlikely that Rumania would have ever promised "safe haven" for Poland, since that would have been an act of hostility against Nazi Germany. Rumania was neutral in the war and, as discussed below, insisted upon imprisoning the Polish goverment and disarming the Polish forces once they had crossed the border into Rumania.
The real reason for Rumania's failure to declare war on the USSR is probably the one given in a New York Times article of September 19, 1939:
"The Rumanian viewpoint concerning the Rumanian-Polish anti-Soviet agreement is that it would be operative only if a Russian attack came as an isolated event and not as a consequence of other wars."
- "Rumania Anxious; Watches Frontier." NYT 09.19.39, p.8.
That means Rumania recognized that the Red Army was not allied with Germany, an "other war." This is tacit recognition of the Soviet and German position that Poland no longer had a government, and therefore was no longer a state.
On the contrary, the British government concluded that these territories should not be a part of a future Polish state. Even the Polish government-in-exile agreed!
See the Maisky Notes. These documents are in the original Russian, with the relevant quotations translated into English below them.
Article 16 of the League of Nations Covenant required members to take trade and economic sanctions against any member who "resorted to war."
No country took any sanctions against the USSR. No country broke diplomatic relations with the USSR over this action.
However, when the USSR attacked Finland in 1939 the League did vote to expel the USSR, and several countries broke diplomatic relations with it. See League Of Nations' Expulsion Of The U.S.S.R., December 14, 1939.
A very different response! which tells us how the League viewed the Soviet action in the case of Poland.
All, including the belligerent Polish allies France and England, agreed that the USSR was not a belligerent power, was not participating in the war. In effect they accepted the USSR's claim that it was neutral in the conflict.
See FDR's "Proclamation 2374 on Neutrality", November 4, 1939:
"…a state of war unhappily exists between Germany and France; Poland; and the United Kingdom, India, Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Union of South Africa,…"
- From The American Presidency Project [PermaLink]
Also "152 - Statement on Combat Areas" – defines
"belligerent ports, British, French, and German, in Europe or Africa…"
- From The American Presidency Project [PermaLink]
The Soviet Union is not mentioned as a belligerent. That means the USA did not consider the USSR to be at war with Poland. For the Soviet Union's claim of neutrality see soviet neutrality.
Naturally, a country cannot "invade" another country and yet credibly claim that it is "neutral" with respect to the war involving that country. But NONE of these countries declared the USSR a belligerent. Nor did the United States, the League of Nations, or any country in the world.
By September 17, 1939, when Soviet troops crossed the border, the Polish government had ceased to function. The fact that Poland no longer had a government meant that Poland was no longer a state.
On September 17 when Molotov handed Polish Ambassador to the USSR Grzybowski the note Grzybowski told Molotov that he did not know where his government was, but had been informed that he should contact it through Bucharest. See The Polish State Collapse.
In fact the last elements of the Polish government crossed the border into Rumania and so into internment during the day of September 17, according to a United Press dispatch published on page four of the New York Times on September 18 with a dateline of Cernauti, Rumania.
The last elements of the Polish government crossed the border into Rumania and so into internment during the day of September 17, according to a United Press dispatch published on page four of the New York Times on September 18 with a dateline of Cernauti, Rumania. See Polish Leaders Flee.
We take a closer look at this issue in the next section below. But a moment's reflection will reveal the logic of this position. With no government – the Polish government was interned in Rumania, remember – there is no one to negotiate with; no body to which the police, local governments, and the military are responsible. Polish ambassadors to foreign countries no longer represent their government, because there is no government. (See the page The Polish State Collapse, especially the NYT article of October 2, 1939).
See The Definition of the State in International Law for more details.
EVERY definition of a "state" recognizes the necessity of a government or "organized political authority." Once the Polish government crossed the border into Rumania, it was no longer a "government."
Even the Polish officials of the day recognized this by trying to create the impression that "the government" had never been interned since it had been handed over to somebody else before crossing into Rumania. See the discussion concerning Moscicki and his "desire to resign" on September 29, 1939, also cited above.
So EVERYBODY, Poles included, recognized that by interning themselves in Rumania the Polish government had created a situation whereby Poland was no longer a "state." This is not just "a reasonable interpretation" – not just an intelligent, logical deduction but one among several possible deductions. As I have demonstrated in this paper, it was virtually everybody's interpretation at the time. Every major power, plus the former Polish Prime Minister himself, shared it.
Once this is problem is squarely faced, everything else flows from it.
By September 15 at the latest Germany had taken the position that Poland no longer existed as a state. Once Poland ceased to exist as a state this Secret Protocol did not apply any longer. Therefore if they wanted to the Germans could march right up to the Soviet frontier. Or – and this is what Hitler was in fact going to do if the Soviet Union did not send in troops – they could facilitate the creation of puppet states, like a pro-Nazi Ukrainian Nationalist state. In any case, once Hitler had taken the position that Poland no longer existed as a state, and therefore that the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact's agreement on spheres of influence in the state of Poland was no longer valid, the Soviet Union had only two choices: either to
The Red Army could cross the border without "invading" or "committing aggression against" Poland. By sending its troops across the border the USSR was claiming sovereignty, so no one else could do so – e.g. a pro-Nazi Ukrainian Nationalist state, or Nazi Germany itself.
Therefore the Polish Army was no longer a legitimate army, but a gang of armed men acting without any legitimacy. Having no legitimacy, the Polish Army should have immediately laid down its arms and surrendered. Of course it could keep fighting – but then it would no longer be fighting as a legitimate army but as partisans. Partisans have NO rights at all except under the laws of the government that does claim sovereignty.
But this is all wrong. The USSR had diplomatic relations with Rumania. The USSR could not permit thousands of armed men to cross the border from areas where it held sovereignty into Rumania, a neighboring state. Imagine if, say, Mexico or Canada tried to permit thousands of armed men to cross the border into the USA!
See Re-negotiation Of Spheres Of Influence in the Former Polish State September 1939.
All this is referred to directly in a Ribbentrop (German Foreign Minister)-to-Schulenburg (German ambassador to Moscow) communication of September 15-16 – Telegram No. 360 of 15 September 1939 – with its reference to "the possibility of the formation in this area of new states."
Note that Ribbentrop is very displeased with the idea that the Soviets would "tak{e} the threat to the Ukrainian and White Russian populations by Germany as a ground for Soviet action" and wants Schulenberg to get Molotov to give some other motive. He was unsuccessful; this was exactly the motive the Soviets gave:
"Nor can it be demanded of the Soviet Government that it remain indifferent to the fate of its blood brothers, the Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians inhabiting Poland, who even formerly were without rights and who now have been abandoned entirely to their fate.The Soviet Government deems it its sacred duty to extend the hand of assistance to its brother Ukrainians and brother Byelo-Russians inhabiting Poland."
- TASS, September 17, 1939; quoted in New York Times September 18, 1939, p. 5; also Jane Degras (Ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy 1933-1941, vol. III (London/New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), pp. 374-375. {See Texts of Molotoff Talks Explaining Military Action for more details.}
The German government was already considering that Poland no longer existed – there's no reference to "Poland", only to "the area lying to the East of the German zone of influence", etc.
A word of explanation regarding the Soviet reference to "the fate of its blood brothers, the Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians inhabiting Poland."
At the Treaty of Riga signed in March 1921 the Russian Republic (the Soviet Union was not officially formed until 1924), exhausted by the Civil War and foreign intervention, agreed to give half of Belorussia and Ukraine to the Polish imperialists in return for a desperately-needed peace.
We use the words "Polish imperialists" advisedly, because Poles – native speakers of the Polish language – were in the small minority in Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine, the areas that passed to Poland in this treaty. The Polish capitalist regime then encouraged ethnic Poles to populate these areas to "polonize" them, and put all kinds of restrictions on the use of the Belorussian and Ukrainian languages.
Up till the beginning of 1939, when Hitler decided to turn against Poland before making war on the USSR, the Polish government was maneuvering to join Nazi Germany in a war on the USSR in order to seize more territory.
As late as January 26, 1939, Polish Foreign Minister Beck was discussing this with Nazi Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in Warsaw. Ribbentrop wrote:
... 2. I then spoke to M. Beck once more about the policy to be pursued by Poland and Germany towards the Soviet Union and in this connection also spoke about the question of the Greater Ukraine and again proposed Polish-German collaboration in this field.M. Beck made no secret of the fact that Poland had aspirations directed toward the Soviet Ukraine and a connection with the Black Sea...
(Original in Akten zur deutschen auswürtigen Politik... Serie D. Bd. V. S. 139-140. English translation in Documents on German Foreign Policy. 1918-1945. Series D. Vol. V. The document in question is No. 126, pp. 167-168; this quotation on p. 168. Also in Russian in God Krizisa T. 1, Doc. No. 120.)
Polish Foreign Minister Beck was telling Ribbentrop that Poland would like to seize ALL of the Ukraine from the USSR, for that was the only way Poland could have had "a connection with the Black Sea."
In occupying Western Belorussia and Western Ukraine the USSR was reuniting Belorussians and Ukrainians, East and West. This is what the Soviets meant by the claim that they were "liberating" these areas. The word "liberation" is conventionally used when an occupying imperialist power withdraws, and that's what happened here.
At the beginning of October 1939 the British and French governments recognized a Polish government-in-exile in France (later it moved to England). This was an act of hostility against Germany, of course. But the UK and France were already at war with Germany. (The USA took the position of refusing to recognize the conquest of Poland, but treated the Polish government-in-exile in Paris in an equivocal manner. Evidently it wasn't sure what to do.)
The USSR could not recognize it for a number of reasons:
It would be an act of hostility against Germany, with which the USSR had a non-aggression pact and a desire to avoid war. (The USSR did recognize it in July 1941, after the Nazi invasion).
Then Germany would have simply marched up to the Soviet frontier.
To permit that would have been a crime against the Soviet people, of course. And, as the British and French soon agreed, a blow against them, and a big boost to Hitler as well.
See Should the USSR Have Permitted German Troops to Come Right Up To Its Borders?.
No other government during WW2 did anything remotely like what the Polish government did.
Many governments of countries conquered by the Axis formed "governments in exile" to continue the war. But only the Polish government interned itself in a neutral country, thereby stripping itself of the ability to function as a government and stripping their own people of their existence as a state.
What should the Polish government leader have done, once they realized they were completely beaten militarily?
Everything that happened afterwards was a result of the Polish government being interned in Rumania.
Here's how the world might have been different if a "rump" Poland had remained after surrender to Hitler:
That would have
All this, and more – if only the Polish government had remained in their country at least long enough to surrender, as every other government did.
In a discussion on the MLG list in March 2008 Barbara Foley wrote:
… If we on the left want to see a revived movement for the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and the construction of egalitarian societies that will allow human beings to be human, then we need to have as clear an understanding as possible of both the achievements and failures of previous attempts at revolutionary social transformation. Many great things happened in the USSR and China as these societies attempted to build socialism; there were also many tragedies and reversals.
Barbara has hit the nail on the head. We are never going to figure out how to build that just, egalitarian society based upon collectivity and cooperation – what has traditionally been called "communist" – until we have learned the lessons, positive as well as negative, from the rich history and experiences of those who have preceded us.
First among these our predecessors are the brave, intelligent, and visionary people of the Soviet Union during the time of Lenin and Stalin (I put Khrushchev in a different category altogether). They, and especially Joseph Stalin, have been slandered, traduced, demonized by the class enemy, the capitalists and their researchers.
This is appropriate. It's logical that the capitalists, and those who support exploitation, should hate Lenin, Stalin and the communists of their time.
However, the experts of the class enemy have shown far more class consciousness than we have! They have not only been promoting lies that benefit them and discourage us – that is to be expected. But they have persuaded us to believe these lies! and that is OUR faults.
I've spent most of the past decade studying the documents from the former Soviet archives that have been published since the end of the USSR in 1991. They shed a completely new light on the history of the USSR during the Stalin period.
I could sum up the main lesson by quoting the title of a song by Weird Al Yankovich: "Everything You Know Is Wrong."
The history of the USSR during these years must be redone again from the beginning. Here's a list of just a few of the cardinal events in this history that are either largely or completely distorted in anticommunist historiography (including the anticommunist historiography in Russia itself):
I could make a much longer list.
In short, nothing we have been told; nothing in the famous "canonical" antisoviet and anti-Stalin books that are routinely cited, is trustworthy.
It is easy to feel indignant at such wholesale lying. But perhaps we should not be surprised that anticommunist researchers, funded by capitalist institutions, should falsify the history of the Soviet Union and the communist movement generally. What should we expect them to do?
Instead, we should look to our own shortcomings. It's past time that we on the Left showed as much class consciousness as the capitalist "scholars". We have to see through their falsehoods.
It's essential that we sweep aside the mountains of lies about the history of the USSR and the international communist movement of the 20th century and learn what really did happen, so we can assess both its weaknesses and strengths, and learn to do better.
Until we undertake that task seriously our efforts towards building that better society of justice and equality cannot possibly succeed. All of our criticism and theorizing will be built on a foundation of lies. Althusser, Foucault, Deleuze and Guattari, Zizek, Badiou, and many others – all "believed" Khrushchev's lies about Soviet history and Stalin, and theorized accordingly.
There's an attempt to likewise demonize Mao Zedong and the Cultural Revolution. For some reason it has not been as successful – not yet, anyway.
There's also an attempt to recuperate the Cultural Revolution, the Chinese Communist Party, and Mao more generally. Some really interesting work has been done on this! Our own Dan Vukovich, formerly of Santa Clara and now teaching in Hong Kong, is contributing to this effort. We need a similar effort with regard to Soviet history of the Stalin period (as well as before and afterwards).
The anticommunist attempt – largely successful, so far – to demonize Stalin and the USSR during his time, is part of a larger reactionary, even fascist, project: to likewise condemn as evil all revolutionary attempts to achieve a non-exploitative society of equality and justice.
We simply must resist it with everything we've got. But we can only do that by patient historical work. Theoretical work has to be grounded on the historical reality – on what really happened, not on falsehoods.
The main failing among those who are recuperating the Chinese communist experience is, once again, one-sidedness. In response to the totalizing negativity of anticommunist falsifiers they are tempted to embrace an equally totalizing positive attitude about the Cultural Revolution. Yet the Cultural Revolution failed, and China had turned decisively towards capitalism before Mao died.
A similar historical movement is going on within Russia now – one to recuperate Stalin and the glory years of the USSR, when the eyes of much of mankind were on the successes, evident and apparent, of collectivization, industrialization, and socialism in the USSR. But this movement is also fatally one-sided, a bourgeois reaction against the reactionary demonization of the USSR and Stalin.
The "criticisms" of communist history that pass as truths today not just in bourgeois textbooks and culture but on the Left as well, are worse than useless – they are a smokescreen of lies. Their purpose is to obscure what really happened and so to prevent us from learning the real lessons of the successes and ultimate failures of our communist predecessors.
The attempts to recuperate the Chinese and the Soviet revolutions – what we might call, as the Chinese called it, "the historical experience of the dictatorship of the proletariat" – share some serious flaws:
Therefore they run the danger of falling into nationalist, rather than Marxist or communist, patterns.
Our task is to learn the lessons, positive and negative, from the Soviet and Chinese experience, so we and those who come after us, can do it better next time.
To do that we need to know what really happened. My presentation today is intended as a small part of that essential work.
To date there has been no critical discussion of the many and puzzling variations in the different texts of the note attributed to Grzybowski.
According to a Polish government website the original text of Grzybowski's reply to Potemkin is as follows. Passages in this text that are not in or are different from the Żaroń text below are in boldface.
Kategoria: II Wojna Światowa
Tytuł: Odpowiedź ambasadora Wacława Grzybowskiego na notę Wie Mołotowa, Moskawa 17 IX 1939 r.
Żaden z argumentów użytych w nocie dla usprawiedliwienia uczynienia z układów polsko - radzieckich świstków papieru nie wytrzymuje krytyki. Według moich wiadomości głowa państwa i rząd przebywają na terytorium Polski. Suwerenność państwa istnieje, dopóki żołnierze armii regularnej walczą. To, co nota mówi o sytuacji mniejszości narodowych, jest nonsensem. Wielokrotnie w naszych rozmowach mówił pan o solidarności słowiańskiej. Gdzie się podziała wasza solidarność słowiańska?
W czasie I wojny światowej terytoria Serbii i Belgii były okupowane, ale nikomu nie przyszło na myśl uważać z tego powodu zobowiązań wobec nich za nieważne. Napoleon wszedł do Moskwy, ale póki istniała armia Kutuzowa uważano, że Rosja również istnieje. Warszawa się broni, państwo polskie istnieje.
Dokumenty powiązane:
Pakt Ribbentrop - Mołotow
Orędzie prezydenta RP do narodu z 1 IX 1939 r.
Nota W. Mołotowa do ambasadora RP w Moskwie W. Grzybowskiego z 17 IX 1939 r.
Dodatkowy protokół do traktatu radziecko - niemieckiego z 28 IX 1939 r.
Źródło: Eisler J., Sobańska - Bondaruk M., Historia 1789 - 1990 Wybór tekstów źródłowych dla szkół średnich, Warszawa 1995- Odpowiedź ambasadora Wacława Grzybowskiego na notę Wie Mołotowa, Moskawa 17 IX 1939 r.
A Russian-language translation of Grzybowski's note is given in I.S. Iazhborovskaia, A.IU. Iablokov, V.S. Parsadanova, eds., Катынский синдром в советско-польских И РОССИЙСКО-ПОЛЬСКИХ ОТНОШЕНИЯХ. Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2001, Chapter One (Online at http://katynbooks.narod.ru/syndrome/Docs/Chapter_01.html. This is the text quoted by IUrii Mukhin, Antirossiiskaia podlost', sect. 179. It is reproduced further below.
According to footnote 128 the authors have taken this text from Piotr Żaroń Agresja Związku Radzieckiego na Polskę 17 września 1939. Los jeńców polskich. Toruń, 1998, p. 47.
The Żaroń text is somewhat different from that quoted in the Polish government website above. Passages in the Żaroń text that are not present in the text from the website are in boldface.
Żaden z argumentów użytych w nocie dla usprawiedliwienia uczynienia z układów polsko - radzieckich świstków papieru nie wytrzymuje krytyki. Według moich wiadomości głowa państwa i rząd przebywają na terytorium polskim [...]. Suwerenność państwa istnieje, dopóki żołnierze armii regularnej walczą. To, co nota mówi o sytuacji mniejszości narodowych, jest nonsensem. Wszystkie mniejszości dowodzź czynami swej całkowitej solidarności z Polskę w walce z germanizmem. Wielokrotnie w naszych rozmowach mówił pan o solidarności słowiańskiej. W chwili obecnej nie tylko Ukraińcy i Białorusini biją się u naszego boku przeciwko Niemcom, ale także legiony czeskie i słowackie. Gdzie węc podziała się wasza solidarność słowiańska? [...]. W czasie pierwszej wojny światowej terytoria Serbii i Belgii były okupowane, ale nikomu nie przyszło na myśl uważać z tego powodu zobowiązań wobec nich za nieważne. Napoleon wszedł do Moskwy, ale póki istniałi armie Kutuzowa uważano, że Rosja również istnieje.
What follows is an English translation of the Żaroń text, the one used by Lebedeva, with variants from the Polish website text. Passages in the Żaroń text that are not present in the text from the website are in boldface. Passages in the website text that are not in or are different from the Żaroń text are in italics.
Not one of the arguments used in the note to\1\ justify turning the Polish-Soviet treaties into empty paper can withstand criticism. According to my information the Head of State and the government remain on Polish territory {...}. The sovereignty of a state continues to exist as long as the soldiers of the regular army continue to fight {...}. What the note states concerning the situation of national minorities is nonsense. All the minorities are proving in action their full solidarity with Poland in the struggle against Germanism. You have spoken many times in our conversations about Slavic solidarity. At the present moment no only are Ukrainians and Belorussians fighting together with us against the Germans, but so are Czech and Slovak legions. So where is\3\ your Slavic solidarity? {...}.During the First World War the territories of Serbia and Belgium were occupied, but it entered no one's head to regard their obligations to these States as non-existent on that account. Napoleon entered Moscow but, as long as the armies of Kutuzov existed, it was considered that Russia also existed. Warsaw is defending itself, the Polish state exists.
\1\ Minor grammatical difference.
\2\ Use of different verb with the same meaning. [The "2" is missing from the original.]
\3\ Slight change of word order.
As can be seen, the two Polish texts far from identical.
Footnote 57 in the Żaroń gives the source Żaroń used:
57 Tamę, s. 68; MiD, WJH, sygn. V-20-10, dok. 2.
'Tamę' means ibid., the work cited in the previous footnote. Footnote 56 is as follows:
56 A. Bregman, Najlepszy sojusznik Hitlera, s. 67.
This work is identified on page 467 as 'Bregman A. Najlepszy sojusznik Hitlera. Studium o współpracy niemiecko-sowieckiej 1939-1941, Londyn 1941.'
The Żaroń volume does not explain the abbreviations 'MiD' and 'WJH.' On page 51 there is a footnote identifying a document as 'Mid, WIH, sygn. V-20-10, dok. 0.' Another document is identified on page 110 as 'WIH, MiD, sygn. V-20-10, s. 7.' These must be the same abbreviations used without consistency.
Such archival abbreviations (for such they must be) suggest that originals of these documents exist somewhere and could be consulted.
An English translation of this note is given as a part of Ambassador Grzybowski's report to the Polish government in exile in Paris dated November 6, 1939 and printed in the volume Documents on Polish-Soviet Relations 1939-1945. Volume I: 1939-1943. General Sikorski Historical Institute. London: Heinemann, 1961, No. 69 pp. 71-90. The source of this text is stated as: Republic of Poland, Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Official documents concerning Polish-German and Polish-Soviet relations, 1933-1939. London: Hutchinson, 1940, pp. 211-212. This is the Polish White Book". The text in question is on pp. 87-88.
We can immediately see that there was no "note" as such. The text described as a note is here given as a short part of a much longer report completed much later. It is represents a part of Grzybowski's official report, not a precise summary of what he may actually have said to Potemkin seven weeks earlier.
In this text (below) annotations are identified as follows:
None of the arguments intended to justify the transformation of those agreements into "scraps of paper" would withstand criticism. According to my information the head of the Polish State and the Government were within the territory of the Republic. The functioning of the Government was by the nature of things restricted by the state of war. "You will not demand that at such a time the Minister for Agriculture should carry out agricultural reforms?" For that matter the question of the Government was not so essential at that moment. The sovereignty of the State existed so long as a single regular soldier was still fighting. "You will not maintain that the Polish soldiers are no longer fighting!"That which the note said about the position of the minorities within our borders was nonsense. All the minorities, including the Jews, had not only given expression to their loyalty, but were actively proving it by their complete solidarity with Poland in her struggle against Germanism. More than once in our conversations, I told him, "you have appealed to Slavonic solidarity. At our side at this moment not only Ukrainians and White Russians, but also Czech and Slovak legions are fighting the Germans. Where is your Slavonic solidarity?"
So many times has the USSR indignantly condemned and stigmatized the Germans' perfidy. The note which you have read me would signify that you had taken the same road.
During the Great War the territories of Serbia and Belgium were occupied, but it entered no one's head to regard their obligations to these States as non-existent on that account. Napoleon was once in Moscow, but so long as Kutuzov's army existed it was considered that Russia existed."
The Russian text is a faithful translation of the Żaroń text above. I reproduce it here because it was the basis for Lebedeva's discussion which is analyzed in the article.
Source: Документы внешней политики СССР. Том 22. Кн. 2. 1 сентября – 31 декабря 1939 г. М.: Международные отношения, 1992. Док. 596 сс. 94-95.
Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR. Tom 22. Kn.2. 1 sentiabria – 31 dekabria 1939 g. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992. Document No. 596, pp. 94-95.
596. Note of the Conversation of the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR V. Potemkin with the Ambassador of Poland to the USSR V. Grzybowski.
17 September 1939. Secret.
To the ambassador, woken up by us at 2 a.m., who arrived at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at 3 a.m. visibly frightened, I read Comrade Molotov's note to the Polish government.
The ambassador, pronouncing the words with difficulty due to his agitation, declared to me that he could not accept the note handed to him. He rejects the evaluation of the Polish military and political situation contained in the note. The ambassador considers that the Polish-German War is just beginning and that one cannot speak of the collapse of the Polish state. The main forces of the Polish Army are untouched and are preparing to mount a decisive counterattack against the German armies. In these circumstances, the Red Army's crossing of the Polish frontier constitutes a completely unprovoked attack on the republic. The ambassador refused to him the government of the Soviet note, which attempts to justify this attack by arbitrary statements, as though Poland had been decisively smashed by Germany and the Polish government no longer exists.
I objected to Grzybowski that he could not refuse to accept the note handed to him. This is a document that comes from the Government of the USSR and contains declarations of extreme importance which the ambassador is obligated to immediately bring to his government's attention. The ambassador would be burdened with a very heavy responsibility to his own country if he refused to carry out this, the most important of his obligations. The question of Poland's fate is being decided. The ambassador does not have the right to hide from his own country the declarations contained in the note of the Soviet government, addressed to the Polish Republic.
Grzybowski clearly did not know how to counter the arguments cited. He tried to claim that our note should be handed to the Polish government through our own embassy. I replied that we no longer had an embassy in Poland. All its personnel are already in the USSR, except possibly for a small number of purely technical workers.
Then Grzybowski stated that he did not have any regular telegraphic contact with Poland. Two days ago, it was suggested that he contact the government through Bucharest. Now the ambassador is not certain whether he can utilize even this path.
I asked the ambassador about the location of the Polish foreign minister. Having received the reply that he was most probably in Kremenets, I proposed to the ambassador that if he so wished, I could ensure the immediately transmission of his telegraphic reports through our lines.
Grzybowski again repeated that he cannot accept the note, for it would not be in keeping with the dignity of the Polish government.
I told the ambassador that the note had been already read to him, so he knew its contents. If the ambassador did not want to take the note with him, it would be delivered to him at the embassy.
At this moment, having decided to send the note to the embassy and have it delivered in return for a receipt before the ambassador went back there, I asked Grzybowski to wait a few minutes for me, explaining that I intended to inform com. Molotov by telephone of his statement.
After my exit I gave the order to use my car to send the note to the embassy, where a member of my secretariat was to deliver it and take a receipt.
Having informed com. Molotov by telephone of the stand taken by the ambassador, I returned to Grzybowski and resumed the conversation. The ambassador against tried to prove that Poland was not at all crushed by Germany, all the more so because England and France were already rendering it real aid. Referring to our entry into Polish territory, the ambassador cried that if it took place, it would mean the fourth partition of Poland and its annihilation.
I pointed out to the ambassador that our note heralded the liberation of the Polish people from war and our help for them to begin a peaceful life. Grzybowski could not calm down, arguing that we were helping the Germans to annihilate Poland. In this situation, the ambassador did not understand the practical sense of our informing the Polish government about the order for Soviet armies to cross into Poland.
I observed to the ambassador that when the Polish government received our note, it would perhaps not only understand the motives for our decision but also agree on the pointlessness of any opposition to our entry. In this way, it might perhaps be possible to prevent armed clashes and unnecessary loss of life.
Since I constantly returned to warning the ambassador of the responsibility he might bear to his own country in refusing to transmit our note to his government, Grzybowski finally began to yield. He declared to me that he would inform his government of the contents of our note. He even turned to me with the request to give him all possible cooperation towards the fastest possible transmission of his telegraphic information to Poland. As far as the note as a document is concerned, the ambassador said as before that he could not accept it.
I repeated to Grzybowski that the note would be delivered to him at the embassy.
After the ambassador left I was informed that the note had already been carried to the embassy and delivered there for a receipt while Grzybowski was still with me.
V. Potemkin
596. ЗАПИСЬ БЕСЕДЫ ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЯ НАРОДНОГО КОМИССАРА ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ СССР В. П. ПОТЕМКИНА С ПОСЛОМ ПОЛЬШИ В СССР В. ГЖИБОВСКИМ
17 сентября 1939 г. Секретно
Послу, поднятому нами с постели в 2 часа ночи и в явной тревоге прибывшему в Наркоминдел в 3 часа, мною была прочитана и затем передана нота т. Молотова*, адресованная польскому правительству.
Посол, от воднения с трудом выговаривавший слова, заявил мне, что не может принять вручаемую ему ноту. Он отвергает оценку, даваемую нотой военному и политическому положению Польши. Посол считает, что польско-германская война только начинается и что нельзя говорить о распаде польского государства. Основные силы польской армии целы и подготовляются к решительному отпору германским армиям. При этих условиях переход Красной Армией польской границы является ничем не вызванным нападением на республику. Посол отказывается сообщить правительству о советской ноте, которая пытается оправдать это нападение произвольными утверждениями, будто бы Польша окончательно разбита Германией, и что польское правительство более не существует.
Я возразил Гжибовскому, что он не может отказываться принять вручаемую ему ноту. Этот документ, исходящий от Правительства СССР, содержит заявления чрезвычайной важности, которые посол обязан немедленно довести до сведения своего правительства. Слишком тяжелая ответственность легла бы на посла перед его страной, если бы он уклонился от выполнения этой первейшей своей обязанности. Решается вопрос о судьбе Польши. Посол не имеет права скрыть от своей страны сообщения, содержащиеся в ноте Советского правительства, обращенной к правительству Польской Республики.
Гжибовский явно не находился, что возразить против приводимых доводов. Он попробовал было ссылаться на то, что нашу ноту следовало бы вручить польскому правительству через наше полпредство. На это я ответил, что нашего полпредства в Польше уже нет. Весь его персонал, за исключением, быть может, незначительного числа чисто технических сотрудников, уже находится в СССР.
/ 95 /
Тогда Гжибовский заявил, что он не имеет регулярной телеграфной связи с Польшей. Дня два тому назад ему было предложено сноситься с правительством через Бухарест. Сейчас посол не уверен, что и этот путь может быть им использован.
Я осведомился у посла, где находится польский министр иностранных дел. Получив ответ, что, по-видимому, в Кременце*, я предложил послу, если он пожелает, обеспечить ему немедленную передачу его телеграфных сообщений по нашим линиям до Кременца.
Гжибовский снова затвердил, что не может принять ноту, ибо это было бы несовместимо с достоинством польского правительства.
Я заявил послу, что нота ему мною уже прочитана, и содержание ее ему известно. Если посол не желает взять ноту с собою, она будет доставлена ему в посольство.
Тут же, решив отослать ноту в посольство и сдать ее там под расписку до возвращения посла, я просил Гжибовского обождать меня несколько минут, объяснив, что намерен по телефону сообщить о его заявлениях т. Молотову.
По выходе я распорядился немедленно отправить ноту на моей машине в посольство, где сотрудник моего секретариата должен был сдать ее тотчас под расписку.
Сообщив т. Молотову по телефону о позиции, занятой послом, я вернулся к Гжибовскому и возобновил с ним разговор. Посол опять силился доказать, что Польша отнюдь не разбита Германией, тем более, что Англия и Франция уже оказывают ей действительную помощь. Обращаясь к нашему вступлению на польскую территорию, посол восклицал, что, если оно произойдет, это будет означать четвертый раздел и уничтожение Польши.
Я указал послу, что наша нота обещает вызволить польский народ из войны и помочь ему зажить мирной жизнью. Гжибовский продолжал волноваться, доказывая, что мы помогаем Германии уничтожить Польшу. При таких условиях посол не понимает, какой практический смысл имеет наше уведомление польского правительства о приказе советским войскам перейти на польскую территорию.
Я заметил послу, что, быть может, получив нашу ноту, польское правительство не только поняло бы мотивы нашего решения, но и согласилось бы с бесполезностью какого бы то ни было противодействия нашему наступлению. Этим, быть может, были бы предупреждены вооруженные столкновения и напрасные жертвы.
Так как я настойчиво возвращался к предупреждению посла об ответственности, которую он может понести перед своей страной, отказавшись передать правительству нашу ноту, Гжибовский, в конце концов, начал сдавать. Он заявил мне, что уведомит свое правительство о содержании нашей ноты. Он даже обращается ко мне с просьбой оказать возможное содействие скорейшей передаче его телеграфных сообщений в Польшу. Что касается ноты как документа, то посол по-прежнему не может ее принять.
Я повторил Гжибовскому, что нота будет ему доставлена в посольство.
По уходе посла мне было сообщено, что нота уже свезена в посольство и вручена там под расписку еще в то время, пока Гжибовский находился у меня.
В. Потемкин
France and England never demanded that the USSR withdraw its troops from what had been Eastern Poland.
On the contrary; Ivan Maisky, Soviet Plenipotentiary to Great Britain, wrote to his government on October 17 and again on October 27, 1937, that the British representatives – on October 27 it was Sir Horace Wilson, P.M. Chamberlain's main advisor – would never demand the return of the Western Ukraine and Belorussia to a restored Polish state but would insist on borders “on its ethnic basis.”
The following documents are in the series "Documents of Foreign Policy of the USSR", published during Eltsin's period. The full bibliographical information is in Russian at the top of each page. For the full documents in PDF format, click here for the October 17 document, here for the October 27 document.
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Maisky, October 17, 1939
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Maisky, October 27, 1939
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Here's an English translation of the headers and the parts I've highlighted in the boxes.
1. 695. Telegram from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR to Great Britain I. M. Maisky to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. October 17, 1939. Special. Top Secret.
I breakfasted today with a colleague of the Minister of Foreign Affairs Butler. From the conversation with him I note the following...
2. Poland. Butler related that Zalesski*, who had recently arrived in London, did not demand the return to "a future Poland" of the Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia... According to Butler's words, English governmental circles consider that there cannot be any question of the return of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia to Poland.
(* Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Polish government in exile.)
2. 731. Telegram from the Plenipotentiary Representative of the USSR to Great Britain I. M. Maisky to the People's Commissariat for Foreign Affairs of the USSR. October 27, 1939. Immediate. Top Secret.
1. I breakfasted with the chief advisor of Chamberlain (and de facto the person who directs his foreign policy), the well-known Horace Wilson. ...
2. Most characteristic was Wilson's views concerning the desirable – from his point of view – outlines of a future peace treaty that must be concluded after a more or less lengthy war... Poland must be re-established as an independent state on its ethnographical base, but without Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia.
The importance of the "Moscicki resignation" question is that it reveals that after Moscicki and the Polish government had crossed into Rumania on September 17, 1939, Poland had no government at all.
We can tell this in two ways:
Therefore Rumanian authorities made up a false story that Moscicki had already resigned on September 15, while he was still in Poland and, therefore, still President of Poland. The problem was that Moscicki was still "expressing the wish to resign" on September 29 – something he would not have done, of course, had he really resigned on September 15!
Moscicki's and the Rumanian government's acts demonstrate that they both agreed about one thing: Since September 17, 1939, Poland had had no government. And that meant that Poland was no longer a "state" under international law.
1. President Ignaz Moscicki of Poland "expressed the wish to resign” on September 29, 1939.
2. The next day Moscicki claimed that he did resign on September 30, after leaving Rumania “as a private citizen” (New York Times 10.01.39, p. 1).
Moscicki needed to say this in order to appear to give a legal basis – a fig-leaf, at least – for the Polish Government-in-Exile being formed in France.
3. The Rumanian government then claimed that Moscicki had really already resigned two weeks earlier, on September 15! (also New York Times October 1, 1939)
The Rumanian government knew that Moscicki could not legally resign when interned in Rumania. If Rumania permitted the Polish government to function as a government – i.e. refused to intern them – it would be guilty of an act hostile to Germany, since Germany was at war with Poland and Rumania was neutral.
In reality Moscicki could not resign. Resignation is an official act. Only a government official can resign. Moscicki was interned in Rumania, and therefore not a government official.
(For text in English, see http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1939pact.html)
The Secret Protocols, Articles I and II
Article I. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each party.
Article II. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San.
The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish States and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.
In any event both Governments will resolve this question by means of a friendly agreement.
The "Secret Protocols" were not entirely "secret"
The map below was published in Izvestiia on September 23, 1939, the day after the Red Army crossed the border.
The map below was published in The New York Times on September 23, 1939, five days after the map above.
It too shows the line of spheres of influence, here called "the demarcation line between the Russian and German Armies." This title shows that it was based upon the map in Izvestiia above.
Other Secret Treaties Relating to These Alliances
The Secret Protocols of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact are often discussed as though there were something unusual and shameful about the practice of secret military agreements.
This is dishonest and misleading. In fact both Britain and France had secret military treaties with Poland.
1. The "Secret military convention" of the French-Polish treaty (traité franco-polonais) of February 21, 1921.
According to Charles L. Phillips and Alan Axelrod, Encyclopedia of historical treaties and alliances (New York : Facts on File, c2001), the text of this "secret military convention" has "vanished" (vol. 2, p. 512).The treaty, and its "reconstructed" secret military protocol, are also published in J(ohn) A(shley) S(oames) Grenville. The Major International Treaties 1914-1973. (London: Methuen & Co., 1974), pp. 116-117.
2. The "Secret Protocol" of the August 1939 British Treaty with Poland.
This was a secret clause specifying that the alliance applied only against Germany. Pretty important clause!
But this secret clause is omitted in most published versions of this treaty – for example, from the Yale University's "Avalon Project", which takes its text from The British War Bluebook,* at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/blbk19.asp
The copy of the secret clause below is taken from Charles L. Phillips and Alan Axelrod, Encyclopedia of historical treaties and alliances (New York : Facts on File, c2001), p. 536. But no primary source is cited for this text, and the name of the Polish signatory is given as "RACZYMSLI" – it should be "RACZYNSKI". Is this a scanning error? a copy error? Whatever the case, the fact remains that this British "secret protocol" remains far more secret than the supposedly nefarious "Secret Protocol" of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact ever was.
I have found the treaty, including the secret protocol, in the following works:
I have put the whole text online here. A PDF version, from Peszke (2005) is here.
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* The British war blue book. Miscellaneous no. 9 (1939) Documents concerning German-Polish relations and the outbreak of hostilities between Great Britain and Germany on September 3, 1939. Great Britain. Foreign Office / New York, Farrar & Rinehart, 1939.
New York Times September 18, 1939, p. 5
By The Associated Press.
MOSCOW, Sept. 17-Following is the text of a radio speech today by the Soviet Premier-Foreign Commissar, Vyacheslaff Molotoff, as distributed by Tass, the official Soviet News Agency:
Comrades, men and women citizens of our great country:
Events arising out of the Polish-German War has revealed the internal insolvency and obvious impotence of the Polish state.
Polish ruling circles have suffered bankruptcy.
All this has happened in the briefest space of time. A mere fortnight has passed and Poland already has lost all her industrial centers.
Warsaw as the capital of the Polish state no longer exists. No one knows the whereabouts of the Polish Government.
The population of Poland have been abandoned by their ill-starred leaders to their fate. The Polish state and its government have virtually ceased to exist. In view of this state of affairs, treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and Poland have ceased to operate. A situation has arisen in Poland which demands of the Soviet Government especial concern for the security of its State.
Poland has become a fertile field for any accidental and unexpected contingency that may create a menace to the Soviet Union.
Until the last moment the Soviet Government has remained neutral. But in view of the circumstances mentioned, it can no longer maintain a neutral attitude toward the situation that has arisen.
Nor can it be demanded of the Soviet Government that it remain indifferent to the fate of its blood brothers, the Ukrainians and Byelo-Russians [White Russians] inhabiting Poland, who even formerly were without rights and who now have been abandoned entirely to their fate.
The Soviet Government deems it its sacred duty to extend the hand of assistance to its brother Ukrainians and brother Byelo-Russians inhabiting Poland. In view of all the above, the government of the Soviet Union has this morning handed a note to the Polish Ambassador in Moscow announcing that the Soviet Government has instructed the higher command of the Red Army to order troops to cross the frontier and take under their protection the lives and property of the populations of the western Ukraine and western Byelo-Russia.
The Soviet Government also stated in this note that at the same time it intends to take every measure to deliver the Polish people from the disastrous war into which they have been plunged by their unwise leaders and give them an opportunity to live a life of peace.
I n the early part of September when a partial mobilization of Red Army reserves was undertaken in the Ukraine, Byelo-Russia and in four other military areas, the situation in Poland was not clear and this mobilization was undertaken as a precautionary measure.
Nobody could have expected that the Polish State would have revealed such impotence and such swift collapse as has now already taken place all over Poland.
But inasmuch as this collapse is a fact and Polish statesmen have revealed their utter bankruptcy and are incapable of changing the situation in Poland, our Red Army, having received large reinforcements as the result of the recent calling up of reserves, must perform with credit the honorable duty placed upon it.
The government expresses the firm conviction that our Workers and Peasants Red Army will this time too display its combative might, conscientiousness and discipline and that in the performance of its emancipatory task it will distinguish itself by new feats of heroism and glory.
Simultaneously the Soviet Government handed copies of its note to the Polish Ambassador and to all the governments with which the Soviet Union has diplomatic relations, at the same time declaring that the Soviet Union Will pursue a policy of neutrality toward all these countries. This determines our recent Steps in foreign policy.
___________
Notes Sent by Soviet
By The Associated Press.
MOSCOW, Sept. 17-Following are the texts of the Soviet note to Poland and the notes to nations maintaining diplomatic relations with Russia, as made public by Tass, its official Soviet News Agency:
The Note to Poland
Mr. Ambassador:
The Polish-German war has revealed the internal insolvency of the Polish State.
In ten days of hostilities Poland has lost all her industrial regions and cultural centers. Warsaw as the capital of Poland no longer exists. The Polish Government has fallen to pieces and shows no signs of life.
This means that the Polish State and its government have virtually ceased to exist.
Treaties concluded between the U.S.S.R. and Poland have thereby ceased to operate.
Abandoned to her fate and left without leadership, Poland has become a fertile field for any accidental and unexpected contingency which may create a menace to the U.S.S.R.
Hence, while it was neutral hitherto, the Soviet Government can no longer maintain a neutral attitude toward these facts. Nor can the Soviet Government re main indifferent when its blood brothers, Ukranians* and Byelo-Russians [White Russians] in Polish territory, having been abandoned to their fate, are left without protection.
In view of this state of affairs, the Soviet Government has instructed the higher command of the Red Army to order troops to cross the frontier and take under their protection the lives and property of the population of Western Ukraine and Western Byelo-Russia.
At the same time the Soviet Government intends to take every measure to deliver the Polish people from the disastrous war into which they have been plunged by their unwise leaders and to give them an opportunity to live a life of peace.
I have the honor, etc.
MOLOTOFF,
Peoples' Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.
The Note to Other Powers
Mr. Ambassador (or Minister):
In transmitting to you the enclosed copy of a note of the Soviet Government of Sept. 17, 1939, to the Polish Ambassador in MOSCOW, I have the honor on instructions of my government to inform you that the U.S.S.R. will pursue a policy of neutrality in relations between the U.S.S.R. and your country.
I have the honor, etc.
MOLOTOFF,
Peoples' Commissar of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R.
The latter note was handed the diplomatic representatives of the United States, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy, China, Japan, Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Finland, Bulgaria, Latvia, Denmark, Estonia, Sweden, Greece, Belgium, Rumania, Lithuania, Norway, Hungary, the Mongolian Peoples' Republic and the Tuva People's Republic.
_____________
* so spelled in the New York Times text; should be “Ukrainians”.
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The whole "spheres of influence" section of the M-R Pact had to be re-negotiated, because the first agreement was over spheres of influence in Poland – and Poland, as a state, no longer existed. So, it was re-negotiated, and the boundaries changed from the first version. Germany got more land of the former Polish state than was called for by the original agreement of August 23 while Lithuania was added to the sphere of influence of the USSR.
The Secret Supplementary Protocol signed on August 23, 1939, shall be amended in item 1 to the effect that the territory of the Lithuanian state falls to the sphere of influence of the U.S.S.R., while, on the other hand, the province of Lublin and parts of the province of Warsaw fall to the sphere of influence of Germany...
- Nazi-Soviet Relations, ed. Jane Degras (New York: Didier, 1948), p. 107. At III. The Pact Executed And Amended, August 23-September 28, 1939, s. 34 (The whole book is online, with the pagination of the original, at Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941).
The Soviets only claimed sovereignty over areas where the majority of the population was either Belorussian or Ukrainian. These were the parts of the Russian Republic that had been seized by Pilsudski's army in 1920 and ceded by Russia to Poland in the Treaty of Riga of March 1921.
They were to the East of the Curzon Line. In 1919 the non-Polish population had been in the large majority. Even after the Polish government had settled Poles in these areas to “polonize” them, Poles were still in the minority. The majority of the population were Ukrainian and Belorussian.
Up to at least September 7 Hitler was considering making peace with Poland if Poland sued for peace. General Franz Halder, Chief of the General Staff of the Army (Chef des Generalstabs des Heeres), wrote in his "War Diary" – Halder F. Kriegstagebuch. Tägliche Aufzeichnungen des Chefs des Generalstabes des Heeres 1939-1942. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1962-1964. I have used Band I. Vom Polenfeldzug bis zum Ende der Westoffensive (14.8.1939 - 30.6.1940).
OB beim Führer (7.9. nachmittag): 3 Möglichkeiten:1. Polen kommen zu Verhandlungen: er bereit zur Verhandlung: Trennung von Frankreich und England, Restpolen wird anerkannt. Narew – Warschau = Polen. Industriegebiet wir. Krakau, Polen. Nordrand Beskiden wir. Ukraine selbständig. (I, S. 65)
7 September 1939The High Command with the Fuehrer (second half of the day 7 September): Three different ways the situation may develop.
1. The Poles offer to begin negotiations. He [Hitler - GF] is ready for negotiations [on the following conditions]: [Poland must] break with England and France. A part of Poland will be [preserved and] recognized. [The regions from the] Narev to Warsaw - to Poland. The industrial region - to us. Krakow - to Poland. The northern region of the Beskidow mountains - to us. [The provinces of the Western] Ukraine - independent.
So on September 7 Hitler was considering independence for Western Ukraine even though, according to the "Secret Protocol" of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact the Western Ukraine lay within the Soviet sphere of influence. This shows that:
Hitler was prepared to negotiate over the Western Ukraine with the Poles, not with the Soviets. The Western Ukraine lay entirely within the Soviet "sphere of influence" as defined by the Secret Protocol of the M-R Pact.
In his entries for September 9 and September 10 Halder repeats that the Germans are discussing the formation of an independent state in the Western Ukraine. This is further evidence that the Secret Protocols of the M-R Pact did not concern any "partition of Poland."
September 9:
OB vormerken: … b) Selbstständigkeit der West-Ukraine. (I, S. 67)
Bring to the attention of the Supreme Command: ... b) The independence of the Western Ukraine.
September 10:
Warlimont: a) Aufruf Westukraine kommt. (I, S. 68)
Warlimont: a) A call to the Western Ukraine is imminent.
Col. Walter Warlimont was deputy head of operations at the German High Command. A note in the annotated text of Halder's diary reads:
Nämlich für die Errichtung eines selbständiges Staates aus der polnischen Ukraine. (I, S. 68 Anm. 6)
That is, for the setting up of an independent state out of Polish Ukraine.
Under September 11 Halder noted that:
Grenzübertritt polnischer aktiver Soldaten nach Rumänien hat begonnen. (I, S. 71)
The flight of active Polish soldiers [= combat troops] into Rumania has begun.
On September 12 Halder noted: "Talks between the High Command and the Fuehrer" and said:
ObdH-Führer: Russe will wahrscheinlich nicht antreten…. [Russe] halt Friedenswunsch Polens für möglich. (I, S. 72)
The Russian apparently does not want to come in…. [The Russian] believes it possible that Poland wants [to conclude a] peace [with Germany].
This is proof that the Germans had no agreement with the USSR to partition Poland.
It is also evidence that the USSR expected that a negotiated settlement would leave a rump Polish state in existence between Germany and the Soviet border.
Halder also noted:
Rumänien will polnische Regierung nich aufnehmen; [Grenzen] zumachen. (I, S. 72)
Rumania does not wish to accept [the entry of] the Polish government; will close [its borders].
[Hitler] denkt an sich bescheiden mit Ost-Oberschlesien und Korridor, wenn Westen wegbleibt. (I, S. 72)
He [Hitler] is prepared to be content with the Eastern part of Upper Silesia and the Polish Corridor, if the West doesn't interfere.
This would have meant that most of Western Poland would have remained part of a shrunken Poland. This is additional evidence that Hitler did not plan on liquidating the Polish state.
By September 12 the issue of whether the Polish government might try to flee to Rumania had obviously been raised, but it had not yet happened.
This means that on September 12 Hitler still believed the Polish government would stay in Poland – because he assumed he would have someone to negotiate peace with.
The same date General Wilhelm Keitel, Head of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (Chef des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht) ordered Admiral Canaris to activate units of the OUN on Polish territory with the aim of forming an independent Polish and Galician Ukraine.
This was to be accompanied by a general massacre of communists, Poles and Jews. During post-war interrogation by Soviet authorities General-major Erwin von Lahousen of the Abwehr (German Military Intelligence) said:
Лахузен: В соответствии с официально провозглашенными фон Риббентропом внешнеполитическими доктринами рейха и полученными [105] адмиралом Канарисом распоряжениями от начальника штаба ОКБ, генерал-фельдмаршала Кейтеля, аб-вер-2 проводил подготовку восстания в Галиции, главными целями которого была ликвидация коммунистов, евреев и поляков. Насколько мне известно, это решение было принято на совещании в салон-вагоне фельдмаршала Кейтеля.
...…из собственноручной записи Канариса в журнале боевых действий следует, что совещание состоялось 12 сентября 1939. Смысл сформулированного фон Риббентропом распоряжения, переданного Кейтелем адмиралу Канарису в виде приказа, заключается в следующем: ОУН (Организация украинских националистов), которая сотрудничала с абвером в военных вопросах, должна была поднять восстание в Польше, опираясь на проживающих там украинских эмигрантов. Целями восстания была ликвидация поляков и евреев.
- Мадер Ю. Абвер: щит и меч Третьего рейха. — Ростов н/Д: Феникс, 1999. 104-105, 107; http://militera.lib.ru/research/mader/03.html (This is the Russian translation of Mader, J. Hitlers Spionagegenerale sagen aus. Berlin: Vlg. der Nation. 1970.)
Lahousen: In conformity with the foreign policy doctrines officially announced by von Ribbentrop and the orders recieved by Admiral Canaris from General-Fieldmarshal Keitel, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command, Abwehr-2 carried out the preparation for an uprising in Galicia, the main goals of were the liquidation of communists, Jews and Poles. As far as I know this decision was taken at a meeting in Field Marshal Keitel's railroad car.
... from Canaris' handwritten notes in the battle journal it follows that this meeting took place on September 12, 1939. The sense of the arrangements formulated by von Ribbentrop and given as an order by Keitel to Admiral Canaris, is as follows: The OUN (Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists), which collaborated with the Abwehr on military questions, was to begin an uprising in Poland, relying upon the Ukrainian emigrants who lived there. The goal of the uprising was the liquidation of Poles and Jews.
By September 15 German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop was writing to Friedrich Werner von der Schulenburg, German ambassador to Moscow, that if the USSR did not enter Eastern Poland militarily there would be a political vacuum in which "new states" might form:
Also the question is disposed of in case a Russian intervention did not take place, of whether in the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence a political vacuum might not occur. Since we on our part have no intention of undertaking any political or administrative activities in these areas, apart from what is made necessary by military operations, without such an intervention on the part of the Soviet Government there might be the possibility of the construction of new states there.
- The Reich Foreign Minister to the German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg)
Ribbentrop no longer referred to "Poland", only to "...the area lying to the east of the German zone of influence…" This shows that he considered that the Polish government was no longer functioning – no longer had sovereignty even in the East where there were no German forces and where the Soviets had not yet entered.
Schulenburg reported this to Molotov and summarized Molotov's reply (to Ribbentrop) the next day, September 16:
Molotov added that he would present my communication to his Government but he believed that a joint communiqué was no longer needed; the Soviet Government intended to motivate its procedure as follows: the Polish State had collapsed and no longer existed; therefore all agreements concluded with Poland were void; third powers [i.e. Germany] might try to profit by the chaos which had arisen…
- The German Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Schulenburg) to the German Foreign Office
So even if the USSR had disagreed with the Germans and had held to the position that a Polish state still existed, the Soviets would have to deal with the fact that Germany no longer did. Germany considered that there was no longer a Polish state, and therefore the Secret Protocol about spheres of influence, agreed upon in the Secret Protocol to the M-R Pact a few weeks earlier, was no longer in effect.
Germany felt it was now free either to occupy what had been Eastern Poland right up to the Soviet border. Or – as we now know Hitler was planning – to form one or more pro-Nazi, anti-Soviet puppet states there. The USSR simply could not permit either of these outcomes.
German General Kurt von Tippelskirch, in his Geschichte des Zweiten Weltkrieges (Bonn, 1954) wrote:
When the Polish government realized that the end was near on September it fled from Warsaw to Lublin. From there it left on Septmbrer 9 for Kremenetz, and on September 13 for Zaleshchniki, a town right on the Rumanian border. The people and the army, which at that time was still involved in furious fighting, were cast to the whim of fate.
The last elements of the Polish government crossed the border into Rumania and so into internment during the day of September 17, according to a United Press dispatch published on page four of the New York Times on September 18 with a dateline of Cernauti, Rumania.
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Here's the evidence. It's the official diary – that is, report – by Potemkin, the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the USSR, about his visit with Grzybowski, Polish Ambassador to the USSR, at 3 a.m. on September 17, 1939.
Potemkin wishes to hand a note to the Polish Government. At first Grzybowski refuses to accept it. But when pressed, Grzybowski admits that he has no contact with his government. Grzybowski says that two days before he had been told to contact his government "via Bucharest" – i.e. in the Rumanian capital – but he is not certain that he could do even that.
I have put Ambassador Grzybowski's "note," with accompanying textual criticism, online here, with the Russian version here.
I have put an English translation of Potemkin's note, followed by the Russian original, on line here. The original source is: Документы внешней политики СССР. Том 22. Кн. 2. 1 сентября — 31 декабря 1939 г. М.: Международные отношения, 1992, Document No. 596, pp. 94-95. I have taken the Russian text from this source.
The Russian original is also published in the book Katyn' – Plenniki Neob"iavlennoi Voiny on pp. 65-67. This is a ferociously anti-Soviet, Polish nationalist work. (http://katynbooks.narod.ru/prisoners/Docs/007.html) This edition has a somewhat different header, which I can't explain. There is an English translation in in Anna M. Ciencala, N.S. Lebedeva, Wojciech Materski, eds., Katyn. A Crime Without Punishment. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008, pp. 45-47.
The note itself, signed by Molotov, People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, is reproduced many places. I've prepared a page in English and one in the original Russian with these documents.
The original source is ibid. Document No. 597, p. 96.
Here is a part of Molotov's statement about the reasons for Soviet intervention as published in the New York Times of September 18, 1939, p.5:
Warsaw as the capital of the Polish state no longer exits. No one knows the whereabouts of the Polish Government. The population of Poland have been abandoned by their ill-starred leaders to their fate. The Polish state and its government have virtually ceased to exist.In view of this state of affairs, treaties concluded between the Soviet Union and Poland have ceased to operate.
...Poland has become a fertile field for any accidental and unexpected contingency that may create a menace to the Soviet Union.
The same NYT article reprinted a part of Molotov's statement to the Polish ambassador Grzybowski – the one cited above – which Grzybowski refused to accept, while agreeing that he did not know where his government was:
Warsaw as the capital of the Polish state no longer exits. The Polish Government has fallen to pieces and shows no signs of life.This means that the Polish State and its government have virtually ceased to exist. Treaties concluded between the USSR and Poland have ceased to operate.
Abandoned to her fate and left without leadership, Poland has become a fertile field for any accidental and unexpected contingency that may create a menace to the USSR.
New York Times reporter Jerzy Szapiro observed in an article published on October 2, 1939, p. 8: "Polish Government Now Blamed For Nation's Military Collapse. Failure of Moscicki Regime to Remain in Warsaw Seen as Vital Factor."
The government is accused of losing its nerve when, on the fifth day of the war, the signal was given for the flight from Warsaw. Polish refugees of all political opinions, even supporters of the regime, are now convinced that had the government remained and had the highest army leaders stayed at their posts Russia might not have marched and certainly would not have the formal excuse of advancing into a country abandoned by its government.
As Szapiro pointed out, the date of September 5, when the Polish government fled the Polish capital and after which it never set up a new capital, was a plausible date after which one could consider that Poland had no government and consequently had ceased to exist as a state.
But Szapiro is wrong in calling this a "formal excuse." It's a fundamental issue. No government means, among other things, no one to negotiate with.
Source: Документы внешней политики СССР. Том 22. Кн. 2. 1 сентября – 31 декабря 1939 г. М.: Международные отношения, 1992. Док. 596 сс. 94-95.
Dokumenty vneshnei politiki SSSR. Tom 22. Kn.2. 1 sentiabria – 31 dekabria 1939 g. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia, 1992. Document No. 596, pp. 94-95.
17 September 1939. Secret.
To the ambassador, woken up by us at 2 a.m., who arrived at the Commissariat for Foreign Affairs at 3 a.m. visibly frightened, I read Comrade Molotov's note to the Polish government.
The ambassador, pronouncing the words with difficulty due to his agitation, declared to me that he could not accept the note handed to him. He rejects the evaluation of the Polish military and political situation contained in the note. The ambassador considers that the Polish-German War is just beginning and that one cannot speak of the collapse of the Polish state. The main forces of the Polish Army are untouched and are preparing to mount a decisive counterattack against the German armies. In these circumstances, the Red Army's crossing of the Polish frontier constitutes a completely unprovoked attack on the republic. The ambassador refused to him the government of the Soviet note, which attempts to justify this attack by arbitrary statements, as though Poland had been decisively smashed by Germany and the Polish government no longer exists.
I objected to Grzybowski that he could not refuse to accept the note handed to him. This is a document that comes from the Government of the USSR and contains declarations of extreme importance which the ambassador is obligated to immediately bring to his government's attention. The ambassador would be burdened with a very heavy responsibility to his own country if he refused to carry out this, the most important of his obligations. The question of Poland's fate is being decided. The ambassador does not have the right to hide from his own country the declarations contained in the note of the Soviet government, addressed to the Polish Republic.
Grzybowski clearly did not know how to counter the arguments cited. He tried to claim that our note should be handed to the Polish government through our own embassy. I replied that we no longer had an embassy in Poland. All its personnel are already in the USSR, except possibly for a small number of purely technical workers.
Then Grzybowski stated that he did not have any regular telegraphic contact with Poland. Two days ago, it was suggested that he contact the government through Bucharest. Now the ambassador is not certain whether he can utilize even this path.
I asked the ambassador about the location of the Polish foreign minister. Having received the reply that he was most probably in Kremenets, I proposed to the ambassador that if he so wished, I could ensure the immediately transmission of his telegraphic reports through our lines.
Grzybowski again repeated that he cannot accept the note, for it would not be in keeping with the dignity of the Polish government.
I told the ambassador that the note had been already read to him, so he knew its contents. If the ambassador did not want to take the note with him, it would be delivered to him at the embassy.
At this moment, having decided to send the note to the embassy and have it delivered in return for a receipt before the ambassador went back there, I asked Grzybowski to wait a few minutes for me, explaining that I intended to inform com. Molotov by telephone of his statement.
After my exit I gave the order to use my car to send the note to the embassy, where a member of my secretariat was to deliver it and take a receipt.
Having informed com. Molotov by telephone of the stand taken by the ambassador, I returned to Grzybowski and resumed the conversation. The ambassador against tried to prove that Poland was not at all crushed by Germany, all the more so because England and France were already rendering it real aid. Referring to our entry into Polish territory, the ambassador cried that if it took place, it would mean the fourth partition of Poland and its annihilation.
I pointed out to the ambassador that our note heralded the liberation of the Polish people from war and our help for them to begin a peaceful life. Grzybowski could not calm down, arguing that we were helping the Germans to annihilate Poland. In this situation, the ambassador did not understand the practical sense of our informing the Polish government about the order for Soviet armies to cross into Poland.
I observed to the ambassador that when the Polish government received our note, it would perhaps not only understand the motives for our decision but also agree on the pointlessness of any opposition to our entry. In this way, it might perhaps be possible to prevent armed clashes and unnecessary loss of life.
Since I constantly returned to warning the ambassador of the responsibility he might bear to his own country in refusing to transmit our note to his government, Grzybowski finally began to yield. He declared to me that he would inform his government of the contents of our note. He even turned to me with the request to give him all possible cooperation towards the fastest possible transmission of his telegraphic information to Poland. As far as the note as a document is concerned, the ambassador said as before that he could not accept it.
I repeated to Grzybowski that the note would be delivered to him at the embassy.
After the ambassador left I was informed that the note had already been carried to the embassy and delivered there for a receipt while Grzybowski was still with me.
V. Potemkin
596. ЗАПИСЬ БЕСЕДЫ ЗАМЕСТИТЕЛЯ НАРОДНОГО КОМИССАРА ИНОСТРАННЫХ ДЕЛ СССР В. П. ПОТЕМКИНА С ПОСЛОМ ПОЛЬШИ В СССР В. ГЖИБОВСКИМ
17 сентября 1939 г. Секретно
Послу, поднятому нами с постели в 2 часа ночи и в явной тревоге прибывшему в Наркоминдел в 3 часа, мною была прочитана и затем передана нота т. Молотова*, адресованная польскому правительству.
Посол, от воднения с трудом выговаривавший слова, заявил мне, что не может принять вручаемую ему ноту. Он отвергает оценку, даваемую нотой военному и политическому положению Польши. Посол считает, что польско-германская война только начинается и что нельзя говорить о распаде польского государства. Основные силы польской армии целы и подготовляются к решительному отпору германским армиям. При этих условиях переход Красной Армией польской границы является ничем не вызванным нападением на республику. Посол отказывается сообщить правительству о советской ноте, которая пытается оправдать это нападение произвольными утверждениями, будто бы Польша окончательно разбита Германией, и что польское правительство более не существует.
Я возразил Гжибовскому, что он не может отказываться принять вручаемую ему ноту. Этот документ, исходящий от Правительства СССР, содержит заявления чрезвычайной важности, которые посол обязан немедленно довести до сведения своего правительства. Слишком тяжелая ответственность легла бы на посла перед его страной, если бы он уклонился от выполнения этой первейшей своей обязанности. Решается вопрос о судьбе Польши. Посол не имеет права скрыть от своей страны сообщения, содержащиеся в ноте Советского правительства, обращенной к правительству Польской Республики.
Гжибовский явно не находился, что возразить против приводимых доводов. Он попробовал было ссылаться на то, что нашу ноту следовало бы вручить польскому правительству через наше полпредство. На это я ответил, что нашего полпредства в Польше уже нет. Весь его персонал, за исключением, быть может, незначительного числа чисто технических сотрудников, уже находится в СССР.
/ 95 /
Тогда Гжибовский заявил, что он не имеет регулярной телеграфной связи с Польшей. Дня два тому назад ему было предложено сноситься с правительством через Бухарест. Сейчас посол не уверен, что и этот путь может быть им использован.
Я осведомился у посла, где находится польский министр иностранных дел. Получив ответ, что, по-видимому, в Кременце*, я предложил послу, если он пожелает, обеспечить ему немедленную передачу его телеграфных сообщений по нашим линиям до Кременца.
Гжибовский снова затвердил, что не может принять ноту, ибо это было бы несовместимо с достоинством польского правительства.
Я заявил послу, что нота ему мною уже прочитана, и содержание ее ему известно. Если посол не желает взять ноту с собою, она будет доставлена ему в посольство.
Тут же, решив отослать ноту в посольство и сдать ее там под расписку до возвращения посла, я просил Гжибовского обождать меня несколько минут, объяснив, что намерен по телефону сообщить о его заявлениях т. Молотову.
По выходе я распорядился немедленно отправить ноту на моей машине в посольство, где сотрудник моего секретариата должен был сдать ее тотчас под расписку.
Сообщив т. Молотову по телефону о позиции, занятой послом, я вернулся к Гжибовскому и возобновил с ним разговор. Посол опять силился доказать, что Польша отнюдь не разбита Германией, тем более, что Англия и Франция уже оказывают ей действительную помощь. Обращаясь к нашему вступлению на польскую территорию, посол восклицал, что, если оно произойдет, это будет означать четвертый раздел и уничтожение Польши.
Я указал послу, что наша нота обещает вызволить польский народ из войны и помочь ему зажить мирной жизнью. Гжибовский продолжал волноваться, доказывая, что мы помогаем Германии уничтожить Польшу. При таких условиях посол не понимает, какой практический смысл имеет наше уведомление польского правительства о приказе советским войскам перейти на польскую территорию.
Я заметил послу, что, быть может, получив нашу ноту, польское правительство не только поняло бы мотивы нашего решения, но и согласилось бы с бесполезностью какого бы то ни было противодействия нашему наступлению. Этим, быть может, были бы предупреждены вооруженные столкновения и напрасные жертвы.
Так как я настойчиво возвращался к предупреждению посла об ответственности, которую он может понести перед своей страной, отказавшись передать правительству нашу ноту, Гжибовский, в конце концов, начал сдавать. Он заявил мне, что уведомит свое правительство о содержании нашей ноты. Он даже обращается ко мне с просьбой оказать возможное содействие скорейшей передаче его телеграфных сообщений в Польшу. Что касается ноты как документа, то посол по-прежнему не может ее принять.
Я повторил Гжибовскому, что нота будет ему доставлена в посольство.
По уходе посла мне было сообщено, что нота уже свезена в посольство и вручена там под расписку еще в то время, пока Гжибовский находился у меня.
В. Потемкин
1939, September 17, [Kuty]. – Order of the Supreme Commander of the Polish Army E. Rydz-Smigly in Connection with the Offensive of Soviet Forces
"The Soviets have invaded. My orders are to carry out the retirement into Rumania and Hungary by the shortest routes. Do not engage the Soviets in military actions, only in the event of disarming our units by them. The task for Warsaw and Modlin, which must defend themselves against the Germans, remain unchanged. Units towards whose formations the Soviets have approached should negotiate with them with the aim of the exit of the garrisons into Rumania or Hungary.
Supreme Commander
Marshal of Poland E. Rydz-Smigly"
Source: Katyn'. Plenniki neob"iavlennoi voiny. Moscow: Mezhdunarodnyi Fond "Demokratiia", 1999.
Катынь. Пленники необъявленной войны. Документы и материалы. Под редакцией Р.Г.Пихои, А.Гейштора. Составители: Н.С.Лебедева, Н.А.Петросова, Б.Вощинский, В.Матерский. М.: Международный Фонд "ДЕМОКРАТИЯ",1999. ISBN 5-89511-002-9
The Russian version of Smigly-Rydz's order is here, at the Katynbooks.narod.ru site, and reproduced below.
№ 6 1939 г., СЕНТЯБРЯ 171,[КУТЫ]. - ПРИКАЗ ВЕРХОВНОГО ГЛАВНОКОМАНДУЮЩЕГО ПОЛЬСКОЙ АРМИЕЙ Э. РЫДЗ-СМИГЛЫ В СВЯЗИ С НАСТУПЛЕНИЕМ СОВЕТСКИХ ВОЙСК
Советы вторглись. Приказываю осуществить отход в Румынию и Венгрию кратчайшими путями. С Советами боевых действий не вести, только в случае попытки с их стороны разоружения наших частей. Задача для Варшавы и [Модлина], которые должны защищаться от немцев, без изменений. [Части], к расположению которых подошли Советы, должны вести с ними переговоры с целью выхода гарнизонов в Румынию или Венгрию.
Верховный Главнокомандующий
маршал Польши Э. Рыдз-Смиглы
ЦАВ, п/1/4, к. 245. Копия. Машинопись. На польском языке.
Опубликовано в кн.: "WojnaObronnaPolski 1939г." Wyborzrodef, Warszawa, 1968, s. 888.
КОММЕНТАРИИ К ДОКУМЕНТАМ
1 Приказ, найденный лишь в копии, в первой публикации был датирован 18 сентября. Однако, на основании других документов удалось уточнить его датировку — 17 сентября, около 22 час. (CM.Z.Godyn. Sprawa rozkazu N.W,z 17 wrzesnia 1939r.// "Zesryty Historyczne" (Paryz), 1979, zesz. 49, s. 195 — 197; Agresia sowiecka na Polske, s. 170).
См. также приказ главнокомандующего солдатам Войска Польского в связи с развитием событий, изданный в м. Крайова, видимо, 20 сентября (R. Umiastowski, Bitwa Polska. Przygotowania i przebieg poczatku wojny polsko-niemieckiej w roku 1939. Londyn, 1942, s. 392).
2 Рыдз-Смиглы (Rydz-Smigly) Эдвард (1886 — 1941), маршал Польши, главнокомандующий Войска Польского в период сентябрьской кампании, художник, близкий соратник Й. Пилсудского, офицер легионов, комендант Польской военной организации (ПОВ), инспектор армии (1921— 1935), после 1935 г. — генеральный инспектор вооруженных сил.
As widely reprinted in Polish sources today, the text of the Polish original of Rydz-Smigly's order is as below.
Sowiety wkroczyly. Nakazuje ogolne wycofanie na Rumunie i Wegry najkrotszymi drogami. Z bolszewikami nie walczyc, chyba w razie natarcia z ich strony albo proby rozbrojenia oddzialow. Zadania Warszawy i miast ktore mialy sie bronic przed Niemcami – bez zmian. Miasta do ktorych podejda bolszewicy powinny z nimi pertraktowac w sprawie wyjscia garnizonow do Wegier lub Rumunii.
- Andrjez M. Kobos. "AGRESJA albo NOZ W PLECY" ("Aggression or a Knife in the Back"). This is the source cited in the hagiographic biography of Rydz-Smigly on the Polish Wikipedia page (accessed July 10 2009).
Anybody who claims that the USSR "invaded" Poland is wrong – because the Polish state did not exist.
But even if it HAD existed, the USSR should never have permitted German troops to come up to its borders.
This was generally recognized at the time.
In his radio speech of October 1, 1939, printed in the New York Times on October 2, 1939, p. 6, Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty, said:
Russia has pursued a cold policy of self-interest. We could have wished that the Russian Armies should be standing on their present line as the friends and allies of Poland, instead of as invaders. But that the Russian Armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace.
Churchill also agreed that it was in the interest of the Allies to have the Red Army occupying these territories:
… here these interests of Russia fall into the same channel as the interests of Britain and France.
Note that Churchill does not blame the USSR for not "standing on their present line as the friends and allies of Poland."
Churchill knew very well that:
It was the duty of the Polish army to stop the Wehrmacht from coming up to the Soviet borders – by stopping it from conquering Poland. But once the Polish army failed to do this, the Soviet army simply had to do it.
The most objective among contemporary bourgeois, anticommunist scholars agree.
Three of the best of them: Jonathan Haslam, Geoffrey Roberts, and Michael Carley, are quoted below discussing the British - French - Soviet negotiations of August 1939.
Given the lack of serious intent in London it was inevitable that the Russians should turn to the Germans. (216)
- Jonathan Haslam. The Soviet Union and the struggle for collective security in Europe, 1933-39. St. Martin's Press, 1984.
The whole of chapter 10, pp. 195-229, “The collapse of collective security,” is very thorough, well-documented, and clear on this.
They [the British and French] saw the [Drax] delegation as a political exercise which would keep Moscow happy and apply pressure on Berlin. In line with this strategy Admiral Drax, the leader of the British delegation, was instructed to delay the conclusion of any detailed and specific military agreements.
When the military mission finally reached Moscow the Russians discovered that Admiral Drax had no written powers to negotiate and, although the French did have the power to negotiate on all military questions, they were not authorized to sign any agreement. By contrast Voroshilov, leader of the Soviet delegation, presented a written mandate to negotiate and sign a military convention. (141)
- Geoffrey K Roberts. The Unholy Alliance: Stalin's pact with Hitler. Indiana U.P. 1989.
Did the Soviet government have another option to protect its security other than the conclusion of a nonaggression pact with Germany? … The answer must be that the Soviet position was both inflexible and justified… War was imminent, and the Germans told Molotov to choose his friends. (209)
The Munich crisis and the failure of Anglo-Franco- Soviet negotiations in 1939 led directly to the Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact. (258)
- Michael Jabara Carley. 1939 : the alliance that never was and the coming of World War II. Chicago: I.R. Dee,1999.
All countries accepted, de facto, the USSR's declaration of neutrality.
That is to say: all, including the belligerent Polish allies France and England, agreed that the USSR was not a belligerent power, was not participating in the war. In effect they accepted the USSR's claim that it was neutral in the conflict.
For the USA, see
A. New York Times September 18, 1939, p. 1:
"Moves by Soviet Give Roosevelt 'War Act' Question. He Is Faced With Decision Whether Neutrality Law Needs New Application."
It was understood here that the note sent by the Soviet to the powers proclaimed its neutrality and asserted that its expedition into Poland was to protect minorities where there was no remaining government. How this profession of neutrality will be received in official Washington remains to be seen.
Officials will study the situation and decide whether the Russian step falls within the scope of neutrality of if it is in act of war. If it is decided that it is an act of war the President may, if he chooses, declare that war exists and the Soviet would be placed in the classification of a warring nation, just as Germany, Britain, France and Poland have been designated.
In that event the arms embargo might be extended to the Soviet and the position of this government materially altered in various other ways.
B. New York Times September 23, 1939, p.3.
"Puzzle Increased in Russia's Status. State Department Lacks an Answer Whether or Not She Is Ally of Germany. 'Neutrality' A Paradox. Officials Without Precedent for Ruling Where Professed Non-Belligerent Takes Territory."
WASHINGTON, Sept. 22 - Whether or not Soviet Russia, although a professed neutral, is actually an ally of Germany was a question the State Department felt unable definitely to answer today.
For the French:
C. New York Times September 24, p. 69:
Though both Mr. Chamberlain and M. Daladier criticized Russia's action, their governments made no apparent moves to draw the Soviet Union farther into the conflict. Presumably under the treaty of alliance with Poland, Britain and France would go to war with any nation that attacked the Polish State. But that move seemed unlikely. The entering of formal protest was expected to satisfy now that the republic, for the moment at least, had disappeared.
A closer look at the claim that the Polish State had ceased to exist. Let's begin with Wikipedia and move on from there. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/State:
The state and international law
By modern practice and the law of international relations, a state's sovereignty is conditional upon the diplomatic recognition of the state's claim to statehood....
The legal criteria for statehood are not obvious. Often, the laws are surpassed by political circumstances.
However, one of the documents often quoted on the matter is the Montevideo Convention from 1933…
Here is a brief summary of the relevant section of the 1933 "Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States."
The state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: (a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states.
The whole text of the Convention is online at the Yale Law School's Avalon Project. It is also at the Taiwan Documents Project.
According to the corresponding Wikipedia article
as a restatement of customary international law, the Montevideo Convention merely codified existing legal norms and its principles and therefore does not apply merely to the signatories, but to all subjects of international law as a whole. {5 - Harris, D.J. (ed) 2004 Cases and Materials on International Law 6th Ed. at p. 99. Sweet and Maxwell, London}
- Montevideo Convention of 1933
According to Thomas D. Musgrave, Self-determination and national minorities (Oxford Monographs in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 235 n. 170, in 1991 the Badinter Arbitration Committee of the European Union used the following definition of the state:
In Opinion No. 1 the Commission had noted, at p. 1495, that "the State is commonly defined as a community which consists of a territory and a population subject to an organized political authority; that such a state is characterized by sovereignty.
The Curzon Line was a demarcation line between the Second Polish Republic and Bolshevik Russia, first proposed on December 8, 1919 at the Allied Supreme Council declaration. The line was authored by British Foreign Secretary, George Nathaniel Curzon, 1st Marquess Curzon of Kedleston. In the wake of World War I and the Russian Civil War, the two countries disputed their borders, and the Polish-Soviet War erupted.
...the line was based on the ethnic composition of the area.
... the final Peace of Riga (or Treaty of Riga) provided Poland with almost 135,000 km2 (52,000 sq mi) of land that was, on average, about 200 km east of the Curzon line.
A close approximation of the Curzon line is the current border between the countries of Belarus, Ukraine and Poland
